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DEMANDING SUBSTANCE OR FORM?
THE SEC’S PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK AS
A BASIS FOR SECURITIES VIOLATIONS
J. Scott Colesanti*
ABSTRACT
In 1998, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC” or “Commission”) released a style manual titled “The Plain
English Handbook.” The culmination of a drive by its Chairman,
Arthur Levitt, the Handbook drew upon the rules of grammar, best
industry practice, and even the support of billionaire Warren Buffett
in calling for a layman’s translation of corporate disclosure
documents.
To varying degrees, commentators noted the significance of the
Handbook. Initial textual studies provided mixed results. The press
marveled at its novelty but securities regulation experts were less
sanguine, chiding Commission members for naming themselves
“language czars of the universe.”
Meanwhile, the cause of corporate disclosure—a mission long
defined by federal case law—continued its second phase as the SEC,
the courts, and stock issuers sought to strike a balance between
financial expertise and consumer satisfaction. From this effort came
the separate but related causes of evaluating substantive content and
delivering it in good faith. These causes eventually morphed,
however, forcing jurists to locate further authority animating the
remedial securities laws. Consequentially the Handbook, at times,
tipped this balance of corporate disclosure.
* Associate Professor of Legal Writing, Hofstra University Maurice A. Deane School of
Law. Professor Colesanti has taught Securities Regulation each year since 2000. He is
a former co-editor of The Business Law Professor Blog, which carries over 100 of his
substantive Posts. Professor Colesanti has designed and taught numerous law school
courses domestically and abroad. He has presented on numerous panels addressing the
response of the securities laws to the economic crisis and, in 2012, he will publish
articles on the Madoff debacle, and the use of wiretaps in insider trading investigations.
Professor Colesanti previously served for a decade each as a securities regulator and an
industry arbitrator.
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Accordingly, this Article traces the gradual yet impressive growth in
importance of a nearly 15-year-old exhortation. To be sure, the
authoritative value of a style manual is a topic of great moment: In
the fall of 2012, changes implemented by the controversial federal
healthcare law required insurers to publish marketing materials in
“plain language.” Further, the Commission itself is gradually
expanding the Handbook’s application to additional mutual fund
disclosures,
proxy
materials,
and
investment
adviser
communications. Those commenting on the rule’s primacy will
undoubtedly note the lessons of indirect agency rulemaking. Of
more immediate consideration, this Article seeks to examine the
subtle means by which a call for simplicity may have become
grounds for violations of securities law, in the eyes of the
government and others. Ultimately, the SEC’s continuing emphasis
on simplicity begs the question of which shareholder
communications are being read at all.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1998, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC” or “Commission”) adopted a seemingly harmless style manual
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titled “A Plain English Handbook” (“Handbook”).1 The manual was
designed to urge issuers of public securities to create more meaningful
disclosures in documents such as prospectuses. Released by the
Commission’s Office of Investor Education and Assistance, the eightythree-page document was specifically targeted at corporate agents tasked
with creating a broad spectrum of public disclosures in the hopes of
generating simpler and clearer documents for investors.2
As late as 2002, practitioners were unsure as to whether the
Handbook had resulted in increased litigation.3 But in subsequent years,
the Handbook has seemingly crept into the judicial psyche in cases
evaluating corporate America’s efforts at meaningful investor
communication.4 In sum, defendants facing accusations brought by the
SEC or private investors need to be more concerned than ever with the
simplicity and clarity of customer communications, and for more than
just reputational reasons.5
Accordingly, this Article analyzes both the morphing of a style
manual into a legislative authority, as well as the wisdom of that
transformation. Part I provides a detailed schematic of the Handbook,
the contents of which range from the substantive to the technical. Part II
summarizes the distinctly American view of the regulation of corporate
disclosure, revealing case law and other, nearly commensurate authority
organized around two distinct eras.
Part III discusses cases from recent years that hold the Handbook
on higher ground than a style manual, and perhaps portend stricter
discipline yet to come. In turn, Part IV provides analysis of the
Handbook’s influence on case law to date. The article concludes by
offering thoughts on the paternalism attending all regulatory efforts at
ratcheting up the communications of corporate management, when such

1. See Plain English Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 7497, Exchange Act
Release No. 39,593, Investment Company Release Act No. 23,011, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370
(Feb. 6, 1998). As used in this Article, “Plain English” connotes the Commissionimposed standard dating from 1998, while “plain English” connotes the more generic,
time-honored standard of clear and concise writing.
2. See OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUC. & ASSISTANCE, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A
PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK: HOW TO CREATE CLEAR SEC DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 4
(1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/handbook.pdf.
3. See, e.g., Michael G. Byers, Note, Eschew Obfuscation — The Merits of the
SEC’s Plain English Doctrine, 31 U. MEM. L. REV. 135 (2000).
4. See infra notes 82–97 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 82–97 and accompanying text.
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efforts largely ignore the commensurate duty of the layman to
understand his investments.
I. THE HANDBOOK’S SPECIFICS

The Handbook’s twelve chapters gravitate towards a truly
substantive nature (e.g., structuring management’s prognostication; the
use of a zero baseline in a graphic disclosing the most recent quarterly
revenue numbers). Most importantly, the Handbook—in both the
several appendices and the text—includes concrete examples of
statutorily required filings and caveats that would ideally become the
standards in customer communications.
A. BACKGROUND AND STATED MISSION
The terse prologue to the Handbook is at once calming and
alarming:
This handbook shows you how you can use well-established
techniques for writing in plain English to create clearer and more
informative disclosure documents.
We [SEC personnel] are
publishing this handbook only for your general information. Of
course, when drafting a document for filing with the SEC, you must
6
make sure it meets all legal requirements.

An accompanying Acknowledgement expresses appreciation to
advisors and reviewers, including various Commission staffers,
unnamed “[c]orporate officials and lawyers, the American Bar
Association,” and even billionaire investor Warren Buffett.7 The brief
Acknowledgement concludes with a note of thanks to then SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt, who was said to have “made [the Handbook]
possible by putting plain English at the top of his agenda so that
investors might better understand their investments.”8
In turn, Chairman Levitt added an introduction that reiterates the
need to continue the fight.9 The Handbook’s initial pages also include
the thoughts of congratulated financier Buffett, who writes that though
6.

SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Prologue to A PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK, supra note

7.
8.
9.

See id. at Acknowledgments.
Id.
See id. at 3.

2.
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the drafter of disclosures occasionally “fails to get the message across,”
he suspected that, at times, “a less-than-scrupulous issuer doesn’t want
us to understand a subject it feels legally obligated to touch upon.”10
B. HANDBOOK OUTLINE
The Handbook’s twelve chapters vary greatly in purpose.
Corporations are encouraged to first assemble experienced drafters who
will initially weigh the length and due date of the planned document.11
Chapters Three and Four describe the need to know both audience and
content.12 Chapters Five and Six form the gist of the document, offering
tips on effective prose (“[u]se the active voice . . .”)13 while displaying
successfully redrafted phrases common to prospectuses.14 Stylistically,
the broad spectrum of suggestions reveals support for simple words,
short sentences, and commonly defined terms.15 Noteworthy here is the
citation to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, “Clearness is secured by using the words
that are current and ordinary.”16
Chapter Seven (“Design the Document”) is a lengthy display of
such basics as characters, fonts, charts, colors, and graphics.17
Meanwhile, Chapters Eight, Nine, and Ten offer proofreading and other
post-production tips.18 Chapter Eleven adds a reading list referencing,
among other authors, Bryan Garner, William Strunk, Jr., and E.B.
White.19
The Handbook becomes much more serious in its first Appendix.
“Summary of the Plain English Rules” explains rules applicable to the
entire prospectus, as well as those technically limited to preparation of
the document’s “Cover and Back Pages, Summary and [Statement of]
Risk Factors.”20 More daunting still is the immediately following cover
page from a 1997 sample prospectus, introduced with the caveat that the
issuer “relied on the SEC rules that were in effect at that time.”21
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 1.
See id. at 7–8.
See id. at 9–13.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 18.
Id. passim.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 37–54.
Id. at 55–60.
Id. at 61–62.
Id. at 65–67.
Id. at 70.
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At times, the Handbook shifts gears dramatically, moving from
lighthearted references to works like “Plain English for Lawyers,”22 to
the demand that time must flow forward in all “graphics showing
information” over a span of years.23 Indeed, for every set of airy style
suggestions there appears to be a random, substantive concern. Notably,
liability is (in the estimation of the Commission) simply not a concern:
The SEC, in its proposing release,24 expressly discounted the fear
among issuers that plain English would “increase liability.”25
C. ENABLING SEC RULEMAKING
Along with the publication of the Handbook, the contemporaneous
adoption of SEC Rule 421 highlighted the cause of clarity, at least
regarding one specific document: the Prospectus.26 The Rule appears in
relevant part below:
Rule 421 — Presentation of Information in Prospectuses . . .
b. You must present the information in a prospectus in a clear,
concise and understandable manner.
You must prepare the
prospectus using the following standards:
1. Present information in clear, concise sections,
paragraphs, and sentences. Whenever possible, use short,
explanatory sentences and bullet lists;
2. Use descriptive headings and subheadings;
3. Avoid frequent reliance on glossaries or defined terms as
the primary means of explaining information in the
prospectus. Define terms in a glossary or other section of
the document only if the meaning is unclear from the

22.
23.
24.

See id. at 31.
Id. at 52.
Plain English Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 7380, 63 SEC Docket
1487 (Jan. 14, 1997).
25. Id. at 6 (“[W]e know of no case that has held anyone liable under Section 11
[of the Securities Act] for clearly disclosing material information to investors.”). The
Release simultaneously disclosed that internal SEC review revealed “that no case
[reviewed] required the use of specific legal language or turned on the use of legal
language.” Id. at 42 n.45.
26. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421 (2010).
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context. Use a glossary only if it facilitates understanding
of the disclosure; and
27

4. Avoid legal and highly technical business terminology.

Academics would later acknowledge the authoritative effect of the
Handbook, noting its requirements ranged from avoiding “jargon and
highly technical business terminology” to adding “increased white space
in prospectuses in order to make the information more readable.”28 It
was also noted that Chairman Levitt did not stop with the amendments
to Rule 421. With the adoption of other rules in 1998, plain English
thus became legally required of all prospectuses issued by both
corporations and investment companies (i.e., mutual funds).29 Further,
foreign registrants were warned ab initio that the plain English
expectations were expected of them as well.30 In the words of a
foremost SEC historian, “It was as if Strunk and White, authors of the
leading work on English Usage, were made czars of the securities
regulatory universe.”31
It was readily accepted by observers that the Commission had
refocused its storied review of documents prepared by corporate
America.32 What was not as easily concluded (even years after the

27. To the same end were contemporaneous amendments to SEC Rules 461
(effective date of prospectus) and 481 (mutual fund prospectuses). 17 C.F.R. §§
230.461, 230.481. As was commented by the authors of a leading text, “[t]echnically,
only the cover pages, summary and risk factors sections” were covered by the
amendments, “but the new communications philosophy [was] strongly encouraged by
the SEC’s staff.” JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 208 (11th ed. 2009).
28. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION 80 (2d ed. 2006).
Professor Hazen termed a “fifth common deficiency” in disclosure requirements to be
“the registrant’s failure to make the prospectus readable and understandable by the
investing public.” Id. at 79–80.
29. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 650 (3d
ed. 2003).
30. See International Disclosure Standards, Securities Act Release No. 7745,
Exchange Act Release No. 41,936, 70 SEC Docket 1474 (Sept. 28, 1999).
31. SELIGMAN, supra note 29, at 650.
32. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 271
(7th ed. 2006) (“In reviewing SEC filings, the Division of Corporate Finance will now
do a plain English check in addition to its other review process.”); see also Ford Lacy,
Frequently Asked Questions Concerning the Plain English Rule of the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, FINDLAW (Mar. 26, 2008), http://library.findlaw.com/
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promulgation of the Handbook) was the extent to which that new SEC
review would reach content as well as form.33 The ultimate scope and
legal authority of the Handbook presented a true challenge to corporate
America, whose attention to the written and spoken words for investors
had been both amplified and forced since the post-Depression legislative
reforms of the 1930s.
II. BACKGROUND: ERAS OF STATUTORY DISCLOSURE

The federal disclosure standards, commencing with the New Deal
legislation of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (“FDR”), have
progressed through two discernible time periods.
A. THE POST-STATUTORY PERIOD (1933-1980)
To say that disclosure is central to American securities regulation
understates both our past and present. The autopsy of the Great
Depression had, in part, identified an embarrassingly low level of
comprehension with regards to the nature of stock market investments.34
Indeed, the debacle’s leading chronicler wrote a short list of causes for
the nation’s unprecedented economic doldrums, listing five factors
including “the poor state of economic intelligence.”35
1. Legislative History
In renouncing a role for the federal government as guarantor of
investments, FDR presented to Congress the first of the federal
1998/Jan/1/126423.html (“I believe the SEC in a very ‘un-Plain English way’ has
‘backdoored’ Plain English into the entire prospectus. Because of this it is likely over
time that Plain English will appear throughout all SEC filings.”).
33. HAZEN, supra note 32, at 272 (acknowledging that “the consequences of
noncompliance ha[d] not yet been fully explored,” while adding that it was
“conceivable that an investor might sue under the antifraud provisions [of the Securities
Acts] claiming that the disclosures although complete were too obscure to be readily
understandable”).
34. See, e.g., JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH: 1929, 168–94 (7th
ed. 1997).
35. Id. at 182 (“[I]t seems certain that the economists and those who offered
economic counsel in the late twenties and thirties were almost uniquely perverse. In the
months and years following the stock market crash, the burden of reputable economic
advice was invariably on the side of measures that would make things worse.”).
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securities laws with the instruction that each and every security sold in
interstate commerce be described in informed detail. As FDR’s 1933
speech to Congress explained:
The Federal Government cannot and should not take any action that
might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued
securities are sound in the sense that their value will be maintained
or that the properties that they represent will earn a profit. . . . There
is however an obligation upon us to insist that every issue to be sold
in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and
36
information.

Even before FDR’s famed presentation of the first federal securities
law to Congress, the stage for enforced disclosure had been set. The
much-followed hearings of the Pecora Commission37 had highlighted the
lack of information available to investors who had rushed to buy illfated foreign bonds in the years preceding the Great Depression.38
36.
37.

CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY 228 (1997) (citation omitted).
A prosecutor from New York, Ferdinand Pecora (“Pecora”), as counsel to the
United States Senate Banking Committee, revived a languishing federal commission
and spearheaded the drive to hold Wall Street executives accountable for the Great
Depression. See Ron Chernow, Op-Ed., Where is Our Ferdinand Pecora?, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 6, 2009, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/06/opinion/
06chernow.html?pagewanted=all. Pecora’s famed (and eponymous) hearings
contributed directly to the Securities Act of 1933. See MICHAEL PERINO, THE
HELLHOUND OF WALL STREET: HOW FERDINAND PECORA’S INVESTIGATION OF THE
GREAT CRASH FOREVER CHANGED AMERICAN FINANCE 235–36 (2010) (crediting
Pecora’s commission work with “laying the groundwork for the securities legislation
that would be offered in the new Congress”).
38. One fateful exchange between Pecora and the president of the securities
affiliate of a large national bank had yielded the testimony that prospectuses attending
the sale of Latin American bonds to American investors had belied internal bank
memoranda questioning the soundness itself of the host country:
Pecora: “Do you find any mention in [the prospectus] whatsoever . .
. of the bad credit record of Peru which is embodied in the
information I have read into the record from your files?”
Bank President: “No; I do not see anything.”
Pecora: “No statement of information . . . was given to the American
investing public . . . concerning the bad debt record of Peru and its
being a bad moral and political risk?”
Bank President: “No sir,” . . . .
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Foremost among those seminal pieces of legislation were the
Securities Act of 193339 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193440
(collectively, “the Securities Laws”). As has been dutifully recounted,
the early days of the Securities Laws cultivated a “symbolic . . . shift of
political power.”41
The decades immediately following this New Deal legislation
afforded numerous opportunities for the judiciary to curtail a burgeoning
and distinctly American view of the infectiousness of corporate
communications. To the contrary, the courts seemed eager to further the
progressive view that company disclosures be held to the highest (albeit
unprecedented) standards. A 1966 Supreme Court decision heralded the
prospectus, stating that it, “in accord with the congressional purposes,
specifically requires prominent emphasis be given . . . to material
adverse contingencies.”42 Moreover, the registration statement was
effectively deemed sacrosanct in 1968 by a New York court finding all
signatories liable for the flawed prospectus of a failed manufacturer of
bowling alleys.43 Likewise, case law paved the way for the view that
myriad faulty disclosures rose to the level of corporate theft—in terms
of both specific admissions by the board to minority shareholders,44 and
obligatory statements by an expanding class of corporate “‘insiders” to
the public at large.45 Thus, whether via SEC enforcement actions or
private class actions, corporate management was duly warned of the
legal consequences of inadequate disclosure. Concurrently, the SEC
reiterated the drive for best communications, even if to the middlemen
of the stock purchase. Significantly, the famed “Wheat Report” of

PERINO, supra note 37, at 236. At another point, Pecora’s dogged questioning yielded
the confession from an expert at the same bank that such bonds had been rushed to the
market because “there was a chance to earn some underwriting fees.” Id. at 235.
39. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
40. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2006).
41. William O. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. 521, 522 (1934),
available at http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/collection/papers/
1930/1934_0300_Douglas_Protect.pdf.
42. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 753 (1975) (citations
omitted).
43. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
44. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
45. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
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196946 concluded that wider dissemination of the preliminary prospectus
to stockbrokers was warranted.47
2. Paternalism and Its Consequences
Indeed, at seemingly every opportunity, the Supreme Court held
that the animating purpose of the securities laws was the implementation
of a policy of “full disclosure.”48
Subsequently, the SEC and the courts clarified that not only lies,
but also good faith misstatements, could form the basis for liabilities
(both civil and criminal) under the new supervisory regime.49 The
collateral damage of the joint assault on investor communications was
the image of the investor itself—the more the mystified masses needed
clarity, the lesser regard in which they were held. Thus flourished
patronizing literature, aiming to subject each innovation to continuing
simplification scrutiny50 or to cause outright questioning of the retail
consumer’s rationality.51

46. See SEC Announces Disclosure Policy Study Report, Securities Act Release
No. 4963, Exchange Act Release No. 8568, 1969 WL 96983 (Apr. 14, 1969)
(announcing the release of the report titled “Disclosure to Investors – A Reappraisal of
Administrative Policies under the ‘33 and ‘34 Acts” and citing SEC Disclosure Study
Proposed, Securities Act Release No. 4885, Exchange Act Release No. 8197, 1967 WL
88872 (Nov. 29, 1967)).
47. FRANCIS M. WHEAT, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DISCLOSURES TO INVESTORS: A
REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE ‘33 AND ‘34 ACTS 45–
64 (1969), available at http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/
collection/papers/1960/1969_Wheat_CH02.PDF.
48. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (stating that
the Securities Act of 1934 “was intended principally . . . to impose regular reporting
requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges”);
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
49. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(k), (l) (2006) (stating private
causes of action for material misstatements and/or omissions in registration statements
and prospectuses without requiring the pleading of reliance or intent).
50. See, e.g., Use of Electronic Media, Securities Act Release No. 7856, Exchange
Act Release No. 42,728, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,426, 2000 WL
502290 (Apr. 28, 2000) (warning issuers utilizing websites that “investors may be
unable to view the issuer’s communications in an appropriate context”).
51. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 232 (11th ed. 2009) (stating that investors “tend to believe that they
are more knowledgeable or skillful than in fact they are”) (citing Brad M. Barber &
Terrance Odean, The Courage of Misguided Convictions, 55 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 41
(Special Issue On Behavioral Finance 1999)).
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Overall, disclosure—and the attendant civil remedies occasioned by
the failure thereof—originally and consistently meant that the
government was “taking the side of the helpless, the suckers, the
underdogs.”52
More importantly, Wall Street was simply too large (and its legally
required filings too voluminous) for the SEC to rely solely on discipline
to encourage proper disclosure. Therefore, the Commission’s arsenal
had to resort, at times, to informal discipline, “No-Action Letters,” and
outright compromise to maintain desired standards.53 One former
Commissioner explained the Commission’s gradual abandonment of the
carrot for the stick (and concomitant growth in private enforcement of
disclosure obligations) in this manner:
All these [Advisory] devices can be praised as innovative and
flexible administrative techniques for effectuating a government
mandated disclosure policy with the least possible disruption of the
business world. This is the kind of informal process that the
independent regulatory agencies were intended to create. But the
very flexibility and extra-statutory nature of these devices turned
them into instruments of perceived rigidity and oppression as the
SEC’s prosecutorial image grew more pronounced and liability
54
imposed in private actions grew even greater . . . .

In sum, a zero-tolerance approach was simply not practicable. As
FDR’s non-guaranty had augured, the exponential growth of public
companies (and their required SEC filings) had simply outpaced
regulatory efforts.55 It was noted that the Commission’s Division of
Corporation Finance, the department responsible for reviewing filings
by public companies,56 shrunk by nearly a third between 1962 and 1980

52. See Douglas, supra note 41, at 522. Douglas, who later became an SEC
Chairman (1937–39), also described the adoption by Congress of the first federal
securities law as signifying that “the money-changers [were] being driven from the
temples.” Id.
53. See ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 318 (1982).
54. Id. at 319.
55. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 266–67 (3d ed.
2003) (noting an SEC “backlog in its examination” of corporate financial reports by the
late 1940s).
56. About the Division of Corporation Finance, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/
divisions/corpfin/cfabout.shtml (last modified June 5, 2012).
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while the number of filings actually tripled.57 Perhaps fortuitously for
the SEC, federal courts began to scrutinize SEC actions centering on
disclosures not readily comprehensible by the investing public and/or
more accurately targeted by other bodies of regulation.58
Consequently, the experts began to signal the need for updated or
“continuous” disclosure59 (i.e., disclosure duties extending beyond the
Such broadening of required
distribution of the prospectus60).
communications was inspired, in part, by a mistrust of the investor.
Simply put, skepticism abounded in the late 1960s and 1970s, as pundits
openly decried the value of sharing all information with the masses or
the utility in basing such egalitarianism on a sole document. A future
law school dean questioned the utility of punishing “insider trading,”61
stating, among other things, that the offense provided perhaps the best
available form of price disclosure.62 Separately, the author of a bestselling book decrying the science of stock picking was pointed in his
criticism of the regulatory emphasis on equality, proposing that there
existed ample evidence of the “enormous difficulty of translating known
information about a stock into an estimate of true value” while declaring
that success was often tied to the efforts of individuals with “superior
intellect and judgment.”63 A law professor who had worked as an SEC

57.
58.

See Karmel, supra note 53, at 262.
See SEC v. Chi. Helicopter Indus., No. 79-C0469, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17214, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 1980) (finding that the SEC’s construction of Rule 10b5 to require disclosure of allegedly illegal conduct “would never succeed in its purpose
of bringing such disclosure to the shareholders”), vacated, SEC v. Chi. Helicopter
Indus., No. 7-C0469, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17022 (N.D. Ill. March 7, 1980).
59. See generally Milton H. Cohen, “Truth in Securities” Revisited, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 1340 (1966).
60. Proposed Amendments to Annual Report Form, Securities Act Release No.
6176, Exchange Act Release No. 16,496, 19 SEC Docket 186 (Jan. 15, 1980) (“These
changes are designed both to facilitate the integration of these two systems [i.e., 1933
Act and 1934 Act disclosure] into the single disclosure system long advocated by many
commentators and to reduce current impediments to combining informal shareholders
communications, such as annual reports to shareholders, with official Commission
filings.”).
61. Defined only by case law, “insider trading” describes the unlawful practice of
using confidential corporate information obtained in breach of a duty owed to either the
corporation or its source. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 643 (1997).
62. See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET passim
(1966).
63. BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE TIMETESTED STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING 190 (6th ed. 1996).
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accountant coined the phrase “The Myth of the Informed Layman.”64
The “myth” referenced the unproven idea that investors were actually
reading the formal document (laden with jargon and technicalities) prior
to stock purchases. The professor concluded that he had “reluctantly
come to the conclusion that the Securities Act of 1933 [was] not
operating as it should and that the prospectus [had] become a routine,
meaningless document which [did] not serve its purpose.”65
B. THE PERIOD OF ACCOMMODATION (C. 1980-PRESENT)
Meanwhile, the prior era’s tolerance of litigation meant that more
cases would travel up to the higher courts, at times resulting in SEC
policies being blessed, negated, or altered. To wit, commencing in the
1980s, the nation’s highest court elucidated that omissions, non-events,
and half-events might also mandate disclosure under the securities laws.
In 1985, the Supreme Court held that a company in the midst of
preliminary merger discussions had a duty to disclose the same to the
public, thus broadening the notion of materiality.66 That landmark
Supreme Court decision was arguably more significant in blessing the
fraud on the market theory, which inherently presumes that equal access
to information precedes the most efficient of marketplaces:
“The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in
an open and developed securities market, the price of a company’s
stock is determined by the available material information regarding
the company and its business. . . . Misleading statements will
therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not
67
directly rely on the misstatements. . . .”

The upshot from such thinking is that investors who can prove
faulty disclosures often need not simultaneously prove reliance thereon.
Despite such occasional doctrinal victories, the Commission’s
ensuing stance can still be characterized as accommodating: Disclosures
prior to an offering of securities remained subject to review, while
corrections to published filings—in lieu of litigation—remained the SEC

64.
65.
66.
67.

Homer Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 BUS. LAW. 631 (1973).
Id. at 631.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
Id. at 241–42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
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action of choice.68 Besides, Supreme Court case law giveth and taketh
away—it was the high bench that had recognized that corporate
statements could, on occasion, be protected by the First Amendment.69
To be sure, the most recent time period of communication
regulation emphasized that the very mission of mandatory disclosure
was being more deeply questioned by observers.70 And commentators
continued to note the questionable utility of forcing issuer information
into the hands of investors (whether sophisticated or unsophisticated).71
At times, a judicial counter-movement ensued, punctuated by the
meteoric growth of complex derivative investments (which often defied
simple or concise description).72 As former SEC Chairman Richard
Breeden stated in the Congressional hearings on the need to reform the
“roll-up process” in limited partnerships, “I have taken a look at some of
the documents filed with us in these roll-up transactions and I would like
to meet the person who can understand all of the disclosures in some of
those documents.”73
Paradoxically, in the years 1980 through the present, the federal
courts, in the preambles to countless decisions addressing complex
claims presented by a complex market, have remained steadfastly true to
the cause of disclosure advanced during the New Deal.74
At the same time, Congress has acted to shield management
speaking in good faith. The prime evidence of this protection is found

68. See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 53, at 321 (noting the Commission’s then
administrative remedies, which were said to be based upon “[t]he ability to compel
issuers to correct filings”) and at 291 (noting the then possibility that “[a] disclosure
statement [could] be approved without the necessity of compliance with [bankruptcy
reorganization] provisions of the federal securities laws”).
69. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
70. See supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text.
71. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 692–95 (1984) (identifying as “[p]oorly
supported rationales for mandatory disclosure” the notions that the process benefits
both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors). Mr. Easterbrook went on to become
Chief
Judge
of
the
7th
Circuit
Court
of
Appeals.
See
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/easterbrook.
72. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-254 (1991).
73. Id. at 11 (comments of SEC Chairman Richard Breeden).
74. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 299
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (reiterating the “fundamental purpose” of the Securities Acts “to
substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor” while
unequivocally stating that “[e]very IPO at issue here is governed by the regulatory
framework created by these Acts”).
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in the “safe harbors” of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995.75
The resulting mixed paradigm has been said to rely upon
distinctions between “hard” and “soft” confidential information.
“Affirmative disclosure requirements” have been generically identified
in the following situations:
(i)

Where expressly required by SEC rules;

(ii)
Where pertaining to the required
Discussion” of forward-looking information;

“Management

(iii)
Where selective or inadvertent disclosure of material
information has occurred;
(iv)
Where there exists a “duty to correct” or a “duty to
update”; and
(v)
Where leaked information (or marketplace rumors) are
76
attributed to the issuing company.

The dual structure signaled that circumstances (as opposed to the
New Deal mission) might define disclosure obligations. The scholars
thus noted that significant disclosures might simply be beyond the
investor’s ken.77 Meanwhile, other authorities cried out for simplicity in
pleadings78 or condemned prolix legal documents outright.79
75. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5
(2006) (“Application of Safe Harbor for Forward Looking Statements”).
76. MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 307 (4th ed. 2007).
77. See, e.g., LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES LAW
182–83 (2d ed. 2004) (describing the mandatory disclosures of “stabilization” trading
by underwriters as undercut by two related problems: (1) investors not understanding
“stabilization,” and (2) investors watching market quotes having no way of learning that
the practice is taking place).
78. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), (d) (mandating averments that are “short and
plain,” and “simple, concise, and direct”); Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir.
2002) (Posner, J.) (“All that’s required to state a claim in a complaint filed in a federal
court is a short statement, in plain (that is, ordinary, non-legalistic) English, of the legal
claim . . . .”) (emphasis added) (quoting Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168
F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999)).
79. See, e.g., RICHARD C. WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS 2 (3d ed. 1994)
(noting a “new intensity” in criticism of legal writing starting in the 1970s); ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES
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Overall, conflicting goals and means presaged an era where drafters
would rush to any form of guidance issued by an expertise federal
agency.
III. THE EMERGING HANDBOOK CASE LAW
The Handbook thus may have been predestined for a primary role
given the courts hunger for guidance. A few cases from recent years
edify both the dangers and efficacy of the Handbook. In 2005, a
California case reminded that a Rule 10b-5 violation (i.e., securities
fraud)80 could be premised upon drafting choices in an IPO
prospectus.81 In 2010, the Third Circuit clarified that audit opinions
issued by third parties would also be subject to plain English review at
the Commission.82 In between, an SEC-commissioned study convened
investor focus groups to evaluate the progress that had been made in
simplifying corporate communications with the public. The study
revealed mixed news when it concluded, “Overall, there were relatively
few comments about specific language in the three [annual report]
documents that made them difficult to use, and more issues with the
length, text density and formatting of the documents.”83
Finally, in the landmark Dodd-Frank reform act of 2010,84 the
plain English requirements were expressly extended to client brochures
authored by investment advisers, registered professionals who, in
general, have been nudged as of late toward the center of the SEC radar
screen.
24 (2008) (noting that in a recent Supreme Court case an appellant had taken seventeen
pages to “discuss peripheral matters before setting forth the legal rule that governed the
case”).
80. “Securities fraud” is wholly defined and largely combated (either by the SEC
or private plaintiff) via Rule 10b-5. Rule 10b-5 is a generic prohibition that (through
successive sub-divisions) outlaws fraudulent schemes, misstatements, and practices in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. See 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (2010).
81. In re Netflix, Inc. Secs. Litig., No. C 04-2978 WHA, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
30992, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2005) (“[P]laintiffs allege that defendants ‘buried’
their churn definition in press releases and SEC filings, and sometimes obscured it by
not stating it in ‘plain-English.’”).
82. See Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP., 617 F.3d 743, 750 (3d Cir. 2010).
83. ABT SRBI INC., FINAL REPORT: FOCUS GROUPS ABOUT PLAIN ENGLISH
DOCUMENTS 15 (May 2008).
84. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
111-203, § 1032, 124 Stat. 1376, 2006–07 (2010).
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A. THE CASE LAW’S EARLY YEARS
Early after its passage, opportunistic litigants began attempting to
use the plain English standard as a sword.85 In a 1999 insurance action,
the plaintiffs’ brief cited the Handbook for the premise that the
defendant insurance company had improperly described its conversion
from mutual insurer to stock insurer in a written plan.86 While the
resulting decision did not list the Handbook as guidance, the case was
ultimately decided in favor of the plaintiffs.87 Tellingly, the court stated,
“The officers of Provident Mutual breached their duty of disclosure
because the policyholder information statement they disseminated
unfairly describe[d] the plan of conversion and thus prevented
policyholders from making an informed vote on the plan.”88
In a 2001 footnote, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals criticized a
poorly written plea agreement for not following the Handbook’s
guidance on brevity.89 In highlighting one sentence in the plea
agreement that exceeded fifty words, the Court noted that “as part of its
‘Plain English’ reforms, [the Commission] recommends that sentences
in the plain English sections of prospectuses should be limited to
twenty-five to thirty words.”90
Over time, the Handbook and its attendant themes rose to the level
of outcome determinacy. Interestingly, one of the earliest cases to rely
heavily upon the SEC’s plain English crusade appeared in a bankruptcy
decision.91 In a case centering on the terms of a “Mirror Loan Note,” the

85.
86.

See infra notes 86-120 and accompanying text.
See Brief for Appellants at 26, Butler v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 42 Pa. D.
& C.4th 484 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (No. 0562 CD 1999), 1999 WL 33940642
(appellants’ brief contesting appellees’ use of the Handbook to support its claim).
87. Butler v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 42 Pa. D. & C.4th 484, 505 (Ct. Com.
Pl. 1999).
88. Id. The court more fully explained as follows:
A statement can be non-fraudulent but still be unfair. Therefore, to fairly describe the
proposed conversion, the information statement must not generalize the risks of the
plan while specifying its benefits, must not omit information needed to give a
balanced discussion to critical components of the plan, and must not fail to explain
certain important words and phrases. The court finds that the information statement
Provident provided to policyholders did all those things.

Id. 498.
89. See United States v. Taylor, 258 F.3d 815, 819 n.3 (8th Cir. 2001).
90. Id.
91. In re Nutritional Sourcing Corp., 398 B.R. 816 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008).
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court was challenged to find a definition of “trade creditor.”92 The
definition offered by the debtor limited repayment to a finite list of
providers of certain grocery goods for resale; the objectors to the plan
proposed a broader construction that included any trade creditor.93 In
denying the arguments that the term “trade creditor” had an
unambiguous meaning and that the term was supplemented by a trade
usage definition, the court looked to prior filings submitted by the debtor
company to the Commission.94 From these filings, the bench gleaned
(by virtue of absence of explanation) the debtor’s intent:
SEC disclosure documents are required to be written in plain English
95
to assist the public’s interpretation of those documents.
Though
the language in . . . SEC filings [by the debtor company] does not
prove what the contracting parties took the term “trade creditor” to
mean when they executed the Mirror Loan Note, if the term was
meant to assume its grocery industry meaning, under the plain
English rule, [the debtor] should have indicated the distinction in its
SEC filings. It is logical to assume that not all potential investors . .
. were versed in the grocery industry; as such, [the debtor] had the
burden to take that into account in drafting their SEC filings. That
[the company] did not provide an explanation of the term “trade
creditor” makes me seriously question whether that term really was
meant to cover only providers of grocery and other merchandise for
96
resale as [the debtor’s official] contends.

As a result, the court rejected a proposed settlement on the basis of
its unfairness to the broader class of creditors.97 Of significance is the
court’s reasoning not only in turning to the SEC filings of a public
company debtor but, in turn, finding 1) prospective interpretative
guidance in those filings,98 and 2) universal definition in the presence of
a failure to specifically define an operative term.99 In sum, the fate of a
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 825,
Id. at 822.
Id. at 820.
Plain English Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 7497; 63 Fed. Reg. 6370,
6371 (Feb. 6, 1998).
96. In re Nutritional Sourcing Corp., 398 B.R. at 829.
97. Id. at 838 (“Though the definition serves the interests of the Plan Proponents, it
is not in the interests of the ‘non-goods’ trade creditors.”).
98. See id.
99. Id. at 829 (“That [the debtor] did not provide an explanation of the term ‘trade
creditor’ [in the SEC filings] makes me seriously question whether that term was
[really] meant to cover only providers of grocery and other merchandise for resale as
[debtor] contends.”).
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public company placed into bankruptcy was in large part decided by the
writing protocol of its securities regulator.
B. TAKING CENTER STAGE
Years later, in a California securities fraud action, the court overtly
utilized the SEC plain English standards to uphold the disclosure of a
company accused of hiding the ball.100 In the Netflix case, a shareholder
class alleged that the entertainment distribution company had led
investors to believe that the churn rate (i.e., the ratio of cancelled
subscribers to continuing subscribers) was a common parlance, when it
was in fact a unique term.101 Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants had “buried” the churn definition in press releases and SEC
filings (and one public appearance) by not stating it in plain English.102
Although the court ultimately found that disclosure could have
been clearer, the subject information was not found to rise to the level of
“misleading” because it was adequately and repeatedly disclosed.103
The court used the occasion to expand upon plain English by stating its
support for the general adage that “a public release, filing or prospectus
can be misleading even though every sentence therein is literally
true.”104 Regarding the specific allegations concerning the churn rates,
the court held that “[t]here are no Plain-English definitions of these
financial measures. They are, like all statistics, artificial constructs.”105
Such constructs being unique to the company (termed “builder of the
financial measure”), and frequently disclosed, they did not constitute
fraudulent statements.106 It was also found that the statements did not
support the claims regarding violation of more pointed SEC regulations;
most importantly, the plaintiffs were said to have not cited any SEC
statute or regulation barring this unique form of disclosure (i.e.,

100. In re. Netflix, Inc. Secs. Litig., No. C 04-2978 WHA, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
30992, at *28 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2005).
101. Id. at *26–29.
102. Id. at *21–24.
103. Id. at *28–29.
104. Id. at *26 (citing SEC v. C.R. Richmond & Co., 565 F.2d 1101, 1106–07 (9th
Cir. 1977)).
105. Id. at *28–29.
106. Id.
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although plain English was factored in, a Rule 421 analysis was not
triggered).107
Thus, Netflix showcases a federal court utilizing plain English to
excuse a form of corporate disclosure alleged to constitute securities
fraud. Noteworthy is that the analysis arguably could have been
unnecessary, had the Commission not previously established a standard
for corporate statements that valued the statements’ ultimate
communicative effect upon the lay reader.108
More recently—and perhaps inevitably—the Handbook took center
stage in one of the many mortgage crisis cases stemming from the
recession that started in 2008. In Malack v. BDO Seidman, the Third
Circuit was asked to consider approval of the plaintiff-friendly “fraud
created the market” theory of securities fraud.109 The theory provides a
controversial but expedient alternative to the statutory “fraud on the
market theory” (which eliminated the reliance requirement for class
action plaintiffs).110 One ground for such expansion relies on the
proposal that registered securities, having been described in a
registration statement filed with the SEC, carry their own aura of
marketability.111
The putative plaintiff shareholder class in Malack sought damages
from the accounting firm that had provided the audit opinions necessary
to complete the SEC filings.112 The theory posited Rule 10b-5 violations
caused by inadequate audits, which enabled SEC registration (which, in
turn, made the subject notes marketable to the public).113 While
acknowledging as a foregone conclusion that the SEC “will consider
whether the applicable disclosure items are explained in sufficient detail
and with sufficient clarity,”114 the Court negated the possibility of an
SEC “merit” review qualifying all registered securities as marketable.115
107.
108.

Id. at *26.
See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 98–100 (11th ed. 2011) (describing the “traditional attitude” of
the SEC in strictly prohibiting communications prior to the prospectus “arousing and
stimulating” investor interest).
109. Id. at 747–49.
110. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988).
111. Malack, 617 F.3d at 747–49. The “fraud created the market” theory was first
accepted by Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981).
112. Id. at 744.
113. Id. at 745.
114. Id. at 750 (quoting 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION § 3.7[2] (Thomson West 6th ed. 2010)).
115. See generally Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, F.3d 743, 752 (3d Cir. 2010).
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The Malack court noted that “[t]he SEC does not read all of the publicly
available information about an offering and then determine the
legitimate price for the security . . . [n]or does [it] endorse any of the
documents involved in the issuance of securities.”116
Despite not accepting the notion that the SEC guaranteed
investments, the Malack court did unquestionably accept the idea that
SEC plain English review regarding quality of communications attended
all registration statement filings.117 Thus, while stymieing the attempt
by a plaintiff class to substitute SEC registration as proof of reliance, the
Third Circuit nonetheless reaffirmed the expectation that the
Commission would inveigle examination of the comprehensibility of
disclosure with the question of registration itself. In essence, the
Malack court fulfilled the promise—that a new, substantive review
awaited countless registrations to come—when the agency’s chair had
publicly warned, “[W]e’re dead serious about [P]lain English.”118
Additionally, other cases from the last decade are evidence of the
Handbook’s significance in encouraging a more equitable reading of
documents—whether or not such reading expressly relied on the
Handbook or not.119 Not surprisingly, buoyed by courts deciding cases
in and out of the field of securities, the SEC succeeded in adding a
requirement to Congress’ 2010 reforms of the financial services industry
obligating those specifically bearing the title of “investment adviser” to
likewise be held to the dictates of plain English.120

116.
117.
118.

Id. at 750 (quoting Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1165–66 (10th Cir. 2000)).
Id. at 750.
See, e.g., Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Keynote Address to the Center for
Plain Language Symposium: Plain Language and Good Business (Oct. 12, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch101207cc.htm.
119. See, e.g., Charles v. Pepco Holdings, Inc., 314 F. App’x 450, 454 (3d Cir.
2008) (Ambro, J., dissenting) (stating that the required notice of conversion of
plaintiff’s pension plan to a “cash balance” plan was inadequate because it failed to
state in plain English that the new plan could reduce some benefits); see also DeBlasio
v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 07 Civ 318(RJS), 2009 WL 2242605, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July
27, 2009) (noting that the New York Stock Exchange suggests that its member firms
make disclosures accompanied by a “concise document, preferably on one or two
pages, written in plain English, and referring customers to places where additional and
more detailed disclosure is available”).
120. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No.
111-203, §956, 124 Stat. 1376, 1905–06 (2010).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF HANDBOOK INFLUENCE
Regardless of the wisdom of the approach (or the generational
approaches attending it), it has been made manifestly clear that the
mandates of public disclosure in the distinctly American model of
financial regulation impose strict, often unforgiving requirements on
public corporations and their agents. That such agents are continually
subject to lawsuits and SEC penalties is not surprising. Experts have
long and frequently opined that plain English has become a de facto area
of review within the Commission.121 However, perhaps the growing
utilization of a style manual to complete the regulatory mission is still a
bit unexpected.
In sum, irrespective of the Commission’s pronounced scope and the
optimal utility of the Handbook, plain English has seeped into the
prosecutorial and judicial consciences and become a concrete factor in
cases alleging shortcomings by company management. The following
four observations seem supported:
1. Starting outside of securities law, plain English commenced
serving a substantive role.
That role may have been a surprise, but it definitely filled a void in
the judicial psyche.122 Criminal courts, civil litigation, and specialty
courts all evidenced a willingness to adopt the English standard boldly
put forth by an administrative agency in the last millennium.123 And
such adoption did not rely on the SEC’s statutory changes to Rule 421.
2. Within the field of securities law, the role of plain English is
speeding to encompass more documents and obligations.
Noteworthy is the recent SEC expansion of its 1998 “pilot.”
Amendments to the rules governing the required filings of the nation’s
10,000 investment advisers took effect in 2010.124
Further, in 2010, the SEC finalized rules extending plain English to
both mutual fund disclosure documents125 and the filings attending asset121. See, e.g., 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 3.7[2] (Thomson West 6th ed. 2010).
122. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
123. See supra Part VI.
124. Amendments to Form ADV, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3060, 17
C.F.R. pt. 275, 279 (Aug. 12, 2010).
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backed securitization.126 It is thus clear that, regardless of the import
any one circuit accords SEC review of documents, Wall Street’s primary
regulator has once again raised expectations concerning the efforts
devoted to customer communications.
3. On a granular level, there exist legal doctrines surviving at the
cusp between dogma and law that may be shaped by plain English.
“Fraud created the market” is a theory that may one day enjoy
increased popularity throughout the circuits;127 if that day arrives, it will
likely be due to the presumption of marketability that is linked to a plain
English analysis.
Likewise, an array of related defenses, theories, and hypotheses are
intrinsically tied to the degree of government review of corporate
disclosures.128
Thus, as Commission involvement with investor
communications is both broadened and more publicized, the very heart
of securities fraud claims will not go untouched.129
125. See Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered
Open-End Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8861,
Investment Company Act Release No. 28,064, 72 Fed. Reg. 67,790 (proposed Nov. 30,
2007) (requiring “key information to appear in plain English in a standardized order at
the front of the mutual fund statutory prospectus”).
126. See Asset-Backed Securities, Securities Act Release No. 9117, Exchange Act
Release No. 61,858, 75 Fed. Reg. 23,328 (proposed Apr. 7, 2010) (“Today, we also
remind issuers of the importance of providing disclosure in compliance with our plain
English rules”); see also Paul Wilkinson, Asset Backed Securities: Disclosure
Regulation or Substantive Legislation?, PAUL WILKINSON BLOG (Oct. 28, 2009),
http://paulwilkinson.com/2009/10/28/asset-backed-securities-disclosure-regulation-orsubstantive-legislation/.
127. See supra notes 64, 106–09 and accompanying text.
128. See supra Parts II and III.
129. See, e.g., In re Netflix, Inc. Secs. Litig., No. C 04-2978 WHA, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 30992, at *24–29 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2005) (using Plain English to resolve the
question of whether a “churn” calculation had been effectively communicated, and
ultimately dismissing plaintiff’s complaint); Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d
743 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding Plain English to fail to justify the controversial “fraud
created the market theory”); In re PEC Solutions, Inc. Secs. Litig., 125 F. App’x 490
(4th Cir. 2005) (denying plaintiff’s claims of fraud via misleading annual report
statements about the issuer’s financial health in light of the “plain English” disclosure
of the risk factors ); DeBlasio v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 07 Civ 318(RJS), 2009 WL
2242605 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2009) (noting the necessity that “cash sweep program”
disclosures be written in plain English); Wilkinson, supra note 126 (highlighting the
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4. On a national level, the persisting emphasis on the mission of
investor disclosure serves to perhaps obfuscate the problems attending
an ever-complicating marketplace.
The history of the attempts by Congress and the SEC to evince an
omnipotent scrutiny of issuers and their communicative efforts has
resulted foremost in supply side regulation that, regrettably, fails to
value the duties of the investor. This omission is startling, particularly
given the attention to preemptive layman education currently attending
regulatory remedies overseas.130
In his 2002 book, former SEC Chairman Levitt told of an
aggressive plan to not only bring clear communications to the public,
but also of the need to avoid corporate accounting disasters by
simplifying an ever expanding set of disclosures:
Companies now need to translate only certain portions of the
prospectus . . . into plain English. By extending the plain English
rule to footnotes and possibly other disclosure documents, investors
of all sophistication levels will be able to decipher the meaning of
corporate legalese. This would be a time-consuming effort. It took
the SEC three years to get companies to adopt plain English in
prospectuses. But it would be one of the most pro-investor steps the
SEC could take to avoid future [accounting frauds such as]
131
Enrons.

Levitt is often heralded as one of the greatest SEC Chairs and a
champion of the small investor.132 But his characterization of market
communication exchanges, at times, reveals a lingering paternalism that
interrelated nature of substantive and “technical” analyses in the context of disclosures
to investors in asset-backed securities).
130. See, e.g., J. Scott Colesanti, Harmony or Cacophony: A Preliminary
Assessment of the Responses to the Financial Crisis at Home and in the EU, 1 Harv.
Bus. L. Rev. Online 60, 62–63 (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.hblr.org/?p=1112 (“While
the SEC appears poised to remain true to its aged crusade to shield the sheep investor
from slaughter, the EU perhaps invites more useful debate on the role of the purchaser
in the ever-complicating bazaar.”).
131. ARTHUR LEVITT WITH PAULA DWYER, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL
STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA DON’T WANT YOU TO KNOW, WHAT YOU CAN DO
TO FIGHT BACK 157 (Pantheon Books 2002).
132. See, e.g., An Interview with Arthur Levitt, CHARLIE ROSE (Mar. 2, 2001),
available at www.charlierose.com/guest/view/2134.
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serves to obfuscate the need for investor accountability.133 Regrettably,
at the present time, such accountability attends foreign efforts at
financial crisis remedies but has escaped attention in American
reforms.134 Perhaps more tellingly, Levitt’s hope for a palpable
expansion of SEC Rule 421 belies both the purely exhortatory nature of
much of the Handbook, as well as the ability of the public to even
readily comprehend communications from the Commission.135
Clearly, repeat efforts at forcing the corporate author’s hand reveal
a mistrust of America’s public companies. On some level, such mistrust
is possibly justified in light of the nagging persistence of pernicious
fraud. Yet, even the casual observer of government regulatory measures
must question the wisdom of a protocol that largely ignores the
responsibilities of the end user at moments of import.136
Of relevant note is a 2008 study commissioned by the SEC which
convened paid focus groups in four cities to study the progress of the
plain English initiative.137 While the report is at times hopeful,138 the
reader cannot help but gaze at the lay investors’ shock when confronting
annual corporate shareholder reports.139 Like the Handbook, the report
is freely available on the SEC website. However, both documents may

133. LEVITT, supra note 131, at 82 (noting that “[s]mall investors often can’t resist .
. . hyperbole.”).
134. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
135. In more recent times, SEC Chairs have noted the expansion of the Handbook’s
initial reach. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Speech Before the Subcommittee
on Contracting and Technology and the Committee on Small Business, U.S. House of
Representatives: Plain Language — The Benefits to Small Business (Feb. 26, 2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts022608cc.htm (“The SEC has
many plain English initiatives underway. Our plain English requirements now apply to
both offering documents and periodic reporting by public companies. They apply to
mutual fund disclosure, which benefits millions of ordinary Americans. And they apply
to our own communications to (sic) the public.”).
136. See, e.g., Jake Zamansky, SEC Struggles with Investor-Protection Rules,
FORBES (Jan. 24, 2012, 1:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jakezamansky/
2012/01/24/sec-struggles-with-investor-protection-rules/ (asserting that the SEC had
“failed to change the ‘accredited investor’ rule in the most important ways”).
137. ABT SRBI INC., supra note 83.
138. Id. at 10 (“[I]t’s getting there . . . .”).
139. See id. at 6 (“‘You almost need an accounting degree and a business degree to
understand everything that’s in [t]here’. . . . ‘I’d have to take a week’s vacation to read
this.’”).
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foremost beg the question of to whom any disclosure—plain,
complicated, short or long—is directed.140
CONCLUSION: ON SIMPLICITY AND CORPORATIONS
The call for more securities industry disclosure documents to be
subjected to plain English standards sounds louder than ever. In 2011,
both existing and newly registered investment advisers were tasked with
providing clients with “brochure supplements written in plain
English.”141 In years to come, the addition of investment products seems
likely to trigger more plain English requirements.142
Thus, as the age of mandatory disclosure enters its third phase (i.e.,
post-Dodd Frank), the SEC’s traditional reliance on New Deal
reformism, expedient common law, and the nation’s unique vision of
fairness will not necessarily expand in meaningful fashion to embrace
novel forms of corporate evasiveness.
Consequentially, robust
enforcement programs may become expediently centered on the written
word itself. The resulting dual-edged sword is that the government will
only be able to cabin bad faith reduced to formal writings, perhaps
pushing more questionable forms of disclosure further from regulatory
reach.
Decades ago, William O. Douglas warned (presciently) that the
Securities Act is ultimately only as beneficial as the corporations it
seeks to demystify:
To understand [the Act], we must “turn back the clock” to simpler
days. We must unscramble our large forms of organization. We
must start anew to bring back into business organization a simplicity

140.
141.

See Kripke, supra note 64, at 633.
Amendments to Form ADV; Extension of Compliance Date, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 3129, 100 SEC Docket 374 (Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279). The investment adviser brochure supplement relays
background information on the registered investment adviser. See generally Charles F.
Hertlein, Jr., Attention Investment Advisers: Plain English Brochure Rule Adopted,
NAT’L LAW REVIEW (Aug. 17, 2010), available at http://www.natlawreview.com/
article/attention-investment-advisers-plain-english-brochure-rule-adopted (describing
the newly required “Part 2” of the brochure obligating the writer to describe 19 items in
narrative format).
142. See, e.g., supra notes 29, 125–26 and accompanying text.
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and directness consistent more with our beginnings than with our
143
present status . . . .

Significantly, the call for a more grass roots approach to legalese
has spread to other regulated fields, such as health insurance. One of the
less controversial aspects of the 2009 Health Care Reform law144 is the
requirement that, starting in September 2012, insurers use “plain
language and 12-point type” in marketing materials.145
Perhaps most importantly, the responses to the malingering
economic crisis call out for a reevaluation of the “wolves/sheep”
metaphor introduced contemporaneously with the federalizing of
securities regulation.146 Specifically, the continuing emphasis on the
simplification of corporate disclosures147 arguably belies a leviathan
financial services marketplace ever distancing itself from its clients.
Further, a rush to loudly discipline transgressors—long a staple of
American securities regulation148—forestalls a rethinking of these
isolated camps. While true reformers perhaps hope for a shift away
from decades-old paternalism, the pragmatists might find solace in
practicalities within reach: Ensure that all future attempts by the
Commission to improve communications come with the clear warning
that such guidelines do not have the weight of statute for purposes of
liability.149 To forgo the lesson of the Plain English Handbook is to
readily accept that a litigious culture facing a complex market may be
forced to rely on style manuals to regulate disputes.
143.
144.

Douglas, supra note 41 at 529–30.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act , Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010).
145. Wendell Potter, This Just In, Insurers Required To Speak Plain English, THE
CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://njtoday.net/2012/02/13/
analysis-this-just-in-insurers-required-to-speak-plain-english/ (noting that the change,
which was intended to compel those offering health care benefits to provide consumers
with “more clearly written information about what their benefit plans cover,” had been
actively opposed by lobbyists for the industry).
146. Douglas, supra note 41.
147. See generally J. Scott Colesanti, Financial Regulatory Reform and the Retail
Investor, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 18, 2009 (noting that the 2009 proposed regulatory reform of
the White House advocated granting the SEC even more “expanded authority to
promote transparency in investor disclosures”).
148. See Yin Wilczek, FINRA Sanctions in 2011 Jump 51 Percent to $68 Million,
Report Says, 44 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 565 (Mar. 19, 2012).
149. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2010) (expressly stating that civil liability
cannot be tied to a Regulation FD violation).

